Copyright 2018 by Khadija Lalani
Northwestern University Law Review

Vol. 113

MCDONNELL V. UNITED STATES: LEGALIZED
CORRUPTION AND THE NEED FOR
STATUTORY REFORM
Khadija Lalani
ABSTRACT—In 2016, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to former
Governor Bob McDonnell’s public corruption case. In 2014, a federal jury
found McDonnell guilty of eleven counts of public corruption for accepting
over $175,000 worth of gifts and loans from Virginia businessman Jonnie
Williams. The conviction was affirmed by the Fourth Circuit. In overturning
the Fourth Circuit, the Supreme Court significantly narrowed the definition
of an “official act” in the federal bribery statute, which is the controlling
statute in most public corruption cases. This Comment argues that the
Court’s decision unduly narrows the bribery statute’s scope to punish only
the most egregious acts of public corruption. This Comment suggests
drawing upon a hybrid between the agency and corporate duties of loyalty in
private law to amend the federal bribery statute and provide a more
practicable standard by which courts can distinguish between regular
constituent services and unlawful public corruption.
AUTHOR— J.D. Candidate, Northwestern Pritzker School of Law,
2019; M.P.A., George Washington University, 2016; B.A., George
Washington University, 2014. My sincerest thanks to Professor Victoria
Nourse for guiding me through the drafting and editing process. Additional
thanks to Professor Max Schanzenbach for helping me navigate relevant
business law. My deepest gratitude to my family and friends for supporting
me through every step of this journey. Finally, endless thanks to my
colleagues at the Northwestern University Law Review for their invaluable
feedback and expert editing, without which this would not have been
possible. Any errors are my own.

29

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW ONLINE
INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 30
I. BACKGROUND ............................................................................................... 31
A. Anti-Corruption Law and the Federal Bribery Statute ........................ 33
B. McDonnell’s Path to the Supreme Court ............................................. 35
II. CRIMINALIZING POLITICS OR ENFORCING ACCOUNTABILITY? ....................... 38
A. The Criminalization Critique ............................................................... 39
B. Public Accountability ........................................................................... 41
III. A THIRD WAY: THE DUTY OF LOYALTY ....................................................... 43
A. Duty of Loyalty: Agency and Corporate Law ...................................... 44
B. The Public Context: A Parallel Scenario............................................. 47
IV. APPLYING THE DUTY OF LOYALTY TO MCDONNELL...................................... 48
CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................... 50

INTRODUCTION
Public corruption is not a new phenomenon in American politics, but it
remains one that poses a fundamental threat to our institutions and way of
life.1 Widespread corruption degrades public office and can erode public
faith in institutions.2 Despite the severity of the public corruption threat, the
Supreme Court has steadily confined its interpretation of the federal bribery
statute,3 culminating in its highly controversial 2016 decision, McDonnell v.
United States.4 In 2014, former Virginia Governor Bob McDonnell was
convicted of eleven counts of public corruption5 for accepting over $175,000
worth of gifts and loans from Virginia businessman Jonnie Williams.6 The
Fourth Circuit upheld the conviction only to have the Supreme Court reverse
and vacate the decision.7 The Supreme Court held that McDonnell’s actions
of setting up meetings, talking to other officials, and organizing events for
1

See What We Investigate: Public Corruption, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, https://www.fbi.gov/
investigate/public-corruption [https://perma.cc/FKY3-A4L9] (briefly explaining the types of federal
public corruption the FBI investigates and why such corruption is a threat).
2
See Matt Ford, Has the Supreme Court Legalized Public Corruption?, ATLANTIC (Oct. 19, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/10/menendez-mcdonnell-supreme-court/543354/
[https://perma.cc/NN2K-XN6J] (arguing that Supreme Court rulings that recast public corruption as
acceptable behavior for public officials “could imperil the public’s faith in democratic institutions”).
3
18 U.S.C. § 201 (2012).
4
McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2375 (2016) (vacating former Governor Bob
McDonnell’s convictions under the federal bribery statute).
5
Rosalind S. Helderman & Matt Zapotosky, Ex-Va. Governor Robert McDonnell Guilty of 11 Counts
of Corruption, WASH. POST (Sept. 4, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginiapolitics/mcdonnell-jury-in-third-day-of-deliberations/2014/09/04/0e01ff88-3435-11e4-9e920899b306bbea_story.html?utm_term=.9a41eafb0fa6 [https://perma.cc/X3A7-4B35].
6
McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2362–65.
7
United States v. McDonnell, 792 F.3d 478, 520 (4th Cir. 2015), cert. granted in part, 136 S. Ct.
891 (2016), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016).
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Williams did not fit the definition of “official act[s]”8 as specified in the
federal bribery statute.
The Court’s decision characterized McDonnell’s actions as distasteful,
but not corrupt, leading some lawyers to wonder if actions that had been
previously denounced as corrupt were now deemed lawful behavior for
public officials.9 In effect, the ruling legalized paying a public official for
political access, so long as the Court is unable to identify an official act under
the narrowed definition.10 While the Court’s opinion in McDonnell built on
the Court’s precedent, it left many wondering why behavior as egregious as
McDonnell’s should be allowed to fall through statutory cracks.11 Given the
Court’s apparent unwillingness to take a stronger stance on public corruption
law, statutory amendment currently offers the best solution to fill these
statutory cracks.
This Comment discusses the tension between the legal validity and
ethical discomfort associated with the McDonnell decision and argues that
the best way to reconcile these tensions is to incorporate a hybrid of the duty
of loyalty inherent in private agency and corporate relationships into the
federal bribery statute. In doing so, this Comment proceeds in four Parts. Part
I provides the factual, procedural, and statutory background of the
McDonnell case. Part II summarizes the prevailing competing theories
underlying public corruption law. Part III introduces the concept of fiduciary
duty of loyalty in the business context. Finally, Part IV proposes a hybrid
standard of review for public corruption cases using the duties of loyalty in
agency law and in corporate law and argues that this standard should be
incorporated into future amendment of the federal bribery statute.
I.

BACKGROUND

Virginia Governor Bob McDonnell’s convictions primarily concerned
his relationship with Virginia businessman Jonnie Williams. Williams was
the chief executive officer of Star Scientific, a Virginia-based company that
developed a nutritional supplement called Anatabloc.12 Williams was in the
process of seeking research that would persuade the Food and Drug
8

McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2372; see also 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3) (2012).
See Ford, supra note 2.
10
After the McDonnell decision came down, Randall Eliason, a George Washington University law
professor and former federal prosecutor remarked, “[Y]ou can just pay for access as long as the official
doesn’t actually agree to decide something for you, but can get you in the room with the other movers
and shakers who are going to do it. Now that’s not considered corruption.” Id.
11
Id. (“What McDonnell and other recent public-corruption rulings risk are institutions where cash
and favors flow freely, where consequences are exceptional, and where public vice is made
indistinguishable from civic virtue.”).
12
McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2362.
9
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Administration (FDA) to classify Anatabloc as a pharmaceutical drug, which
would significantly enhance its profitability.13 McDonnell first met Williams
in 2009 when Williams offered McDonnell the use of his private airplane to
assist with McDonnell’s election campaign.14 After McDonnell was elected
governor in 2010, Williams once again brought McDonnell on his private
plane, at which point Williams mentioned that he could use the Governor’s
help with securing funding from a Virginia state agency for Anatabloc
research at one of Virginia’s public universities.15 McDonnell agreed to
introduce Williams to Dr. William Hazel, Virginia’s then-Secretary of
Health and Human Resources.16 The following spring, McDonnell’s wife,
Maureen McDonnell, offered to seat Williams next to the Governor at a
political rally.17 Before the rally, Williams took Mrs. McDonnell on a
$20,000 shopping spree.18
A few days after the rally, during a meeting at the governor’s mansion,
Mrs. McDonnell agreed to assist in marketing Anatabloc, and she asked
Williams for a $15,000 gift and $50,000 in loans to help with her family’s
financial troubles.19 That summer, the McDonnells visited Williams’s
vacation home and the Governor borrowed Williams’s Ferrari during the
vacation. Shortly after the vacation, McDonnell asked Dr. Hazel to send a
staff member to meet with Williams about Star Scientific.20 In August 2011,
McDonnell hosted a lunch at the governor’s mansion during which Star
Scientific gave out free samples of Anatabloc and distributed eight $25,000
checks to researchers from Virginia’s public universities for the preparation

13

United States v. McDonnell, 792 F.3d 478, 487 (4th Cir. 2015), cert. granted in part, 136 S. Ct.
891 (2016), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016); see also Is It Really ‘FDA Approved?’, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/ucm047470.htm [https://perma.cc/
7M6H-F3TR] (“New drugs and certain biologics must be proven safe and effective to FDA’s satisfaction
before companies can market them in interstate commerce.”).
14
McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2362.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id. Williams paid $11,000 for clothes at Oscar de la Renta, spent $5,685 at Louis Vuitton, and
spent $2,604 at Bergdorf Goodman during the shopping trip in New York City. Rosalind S. Helderman
et al., Former Va. Gov. and Wife Charged in Gifts Case, WASH. POST (Jan. 21, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-politics/former-va-gov-mcdonnell-and-wife-chargedin-gifts-case/2014/01/21/1ed704d2-82cb-11e3-9dd4-e7278db80d86_
story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.96e1c27d51dc [https://perma.cc/LUY5-WNBM].
19
McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2362–63. In December 2009, Maureen McDonnell emailed her husband
and said, “We are broke, have an unconscionable amount in credit card debt already, and this Inaugural
is killing us!!” Further, “[t]wice, authorities said the McDonnells went to Williams for loans as they
struggled to make payments on expensive beach houses they had bought in Virginia Beach with the
intention of renting them to vacationers.” Helderman et al., supra note 18.
20
McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2363.
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of grant proposals.21 Finally, Williams bought a Rolex watch for Mrs.
McDonnell to gift to her husband as a Christmas present, loaned the
McDonnell family an additional $20,000, and gave the McDonnells’
daughter a wedding gift of $10,000.22
Between 2009 and 2012, the McDonnells accepted over $175,000
worth of gifts and loans from Williams while the Governor arranged
meetings between Williams and state agency officials.23 The investigation
and trial that ensued captured the public’s attention.24 Although numerous
elected officials nationwide have faced corruption charges,25 the combination
of McDonnell’s defense—which highlighted his crumbling marriage as the
basis for his misdeeds—and the scale of the financial exchanges between the
McDonnells and Williams left many spectators intrigued, perplexed, and
seeking answers.
A. Anti-Corruption Law and the Federal Bribery Statute
While it may seem apparent that McDonnell accepted extravagant gifts
from Williams and provided him favors in return, the exchanges outlined
above fail to meet the high bar for establishing bribery under federal law. It
is helpful to distinguish between the social perception of public corruption
and the current legal definition of corruption. What society and courts view
as corrupt political conduct depends largely on social and political norms,
which are difficult to codify into law.26 Although U.S. federal public
corruption statutes are not particularly consolidated or organized, the general

21

Id.
Id. at 2363–65.
23
Id. at 2362–65.
24
See, e.g., Trip Gabriel, Former Governor in Virginia Guilty in Bribery Case, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4,
2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/05/us/bob-mcdonnell-maureen-mcdonnell-virginia-verdict.
html [https://perma.cc/H3Y9-5RTB]; Frank Green & Jim Nolan, McDonnell Trial Judge: ‘A Price Must
be Paid’, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH (Jan. 7, 2015), http://www.richmond.com/news/virginia/
government-politics/mcdonnell-trial-judge-a-price-must-be-paid/article_025024c5-5bbb-5ca3-8772323a12f37e4b.html [https://perma.cc/27AL-S492]; Amy Davidson Sorkin, The Supreme Court’s
Bribery-Blessing McDonnell Decision, NEW YORKER (June 27, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/
news/amy-davidson/the-supreme-courts-bribery-blessing-mcdonnell-decision [https://perma.cc/M655688M].
25
See, e.g., Rebecca Davis O’Brien & Erica Orden, Federal Prosecutors Launch Assault on Public
Corruption in New York State, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 6, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/federalprosecutors-launch-assault-on-public-corruption-in-new-york-state-1423534577
[https://perma.cc/6KSQ-DTBK] (highlighting federal prosecutorial strategy on targeting corruption
among Albany public officials).
26
See, e.g., Mark Philp, Conceptualizing Political Corruption, in POLITICAL CORRUPTION:
CONCEPTS & CONTEXTS 41, 46 (Arnold J. Heidenheimer & Michael Johnston eds., 3d ed. 2002) (noting
that rules cannot capture the sense of inappropriateness of behavior that underlies an accusation of
corruption).
22
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idea of quid pro quo bribery,27 or trading government action for private
enrichment, underpins the federal bribery statute and other statutes that
incorporate the federal bribery statute’s standard by reference.28 A
prototypical example of a quid pro quo is an elected official voting for a
piece of legislation in return for a sum of cash from a constituent. While this
type of quid pro quo behavior is obvious and egregious enough to be
characterized as corrupt conduct, it can often be extremely difficult to prove
all three necessary components: (1) the quid (thing given to the official), (2)
the pro (in exchange for), and (3) the quo (official act).29
Investigation into whether a specific fact pattern meets each part of the
quid pro quo formula is the basis of public corruption law.30 Unfortunately,
most public corruption cases do not fit neatly within a prototypical quid pro
quo scenario—they are usually far more ambiguous. For example, instead of
voting for a piece of legislation, an elected official might simply speak
favorably about a private interest group to the relevant congressional
committee, still in return for cash. In that scenario, while the quid still exists,
it may be more difficult to establish the quo element, since speaking
favorably of an interest group would likely not qualify as an “official act”
(the quo) under statute.31 Prosecutors thus face a high burden of proof when
bringing federal corruption charges.32
The language of the federal bribery statute explicitly makes it a crime
for a public official to “receive or accept anything of value” in exchange for

27

See McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2372 (“Section 201 prohibits quid pro quo corruption—the exchange
of a thing of value for an ‘official act.’”).
28
Core statutes include 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2012) (criminalizing bribery and illegal receipt of
gratuities); 18 U.S.C. § 666 (2012) (criminalizing bribery involving federal funds); 18 U.S.C. § 1951
(2012) (the Hobbs Act, criminalizing extortion in interstate commerce); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 (2012)
(covering “[f]rauds and swindles”); and 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2012) (the honest services statute, limited by
Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010), in which the Court interpreted the statute narrowly as an
anti-bribery measure).
29
Jacob Eisler, McDonnell and Anti-Corruption’s Last Stand, 50 U.C.D. L. REV. 1619, 1629 (2017)
(“Each element of quid pro quo—the quid the public official receives, the quo he performs for the private
party, and the pro connecting them—can be variously parsed, producing shifting levels of obligation.”).
30
Id. at 1627 (“In legal enforcement, corrupt acts are often characterized as quid pro quo bribery,
wherein the official trades governmental action in exchange for private enrichment.”).
31
Id. at 1629; see also 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3) (2012) (“[A]ny decision or action on any question,
matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy, which may at any time be pending, or which may by law
be brought before any public official, in such official’s official capacity, or in such official’s place of trust
or profit.”).
32
See Nick Corasaniti, Overturned Convictions Loom Over Menendez’s Corruption Trial, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/27/nyregion/overturned-convictions-loomover-menendezs-corruption-trial.html [https://perma.cc/GTR7-4ZR2] (noting that “prosecutors in Mr.
Menendez’s case have a well-defined higher bar to clear” in the post McDonnell era, after the definition
of quid pro quo was severely narrowed).
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being “influenced in the performance of any official act.”33 The statute
defines “official act” as: “any decision or action on any question, matter,
cause, suit, proceeding or controversy, which may at any time be pending,
or which may by law be brought before any public official, in such official’s
official capacity, or in such official’s place of trust or profit.”34 The gravamen
of the dispute in McDonnell’s case was whether his actions throughout his
dealings with Williams qualified as “official act[s]” under the federal bribery
statute.35
Among the eleven counts brought against McDonnell, prosecutors
argued that McDonnell accepted bribes and kickbacks in violation of the
federal Hobbs Act36 and honest services fraud statutes.37 McDonnell and the
government agreed that the Hobbs Act extortion and honest services fraud
under which McDonnell was charged should be evaluated according to the
federal bribery statute, since the charges were based on allegations of
bribery.38 Therefore, the case turned on each court’s interpretation of
“official act” within the federal bribery statute. Unless a jury could find that
McDonnell’s acts constituted “official acts” under the bribery statute, the
former Governor could not be convicted.
B. McDonnell’s Path to the Supreme Court
After McDonnell was charged, his fate rested on each court’s
determination of whether his favors to Williams met the definition of
“official act.” In 2014, a federal jury convicted McDonnell and his wife of
eleven counts of public corruption, rooted in the federal bribery statute.39 The
government’s proposed jury instruction, which the district court issued to the
jury, included the statutory definition of “official act”40 and defined the term
33

18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2) (2012).
§ 201(a)(3).
35
McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2361.
36
18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (2012).
37
The honest services fraud statutes criminalize “fraudulent schemes to deprive another of honest
services through bribes or kickbacks.” McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2365 (2016) (citing
Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 404 (2010)). “The Hobbs Act prohibits obtaining property ‘under
color of official right,’ 18 U.S.C. § 1951, and the Court has interpreted the statute to encompass ‘taking
a bribe.’” Federal Corruption Statutes—Bribery—Definition of Official Act—McDonnell v. United
States, 130 HARV. L. REV. 467, 468 n.22 (2016) (internal citations omitted). Therefore, the federal bribery
statute’s definition of bribery is incorporated by reference into honest services fraud based on bribery and
Hobbs Act extortion charges.
38
McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2365; see also Skilling, 561 U.S. at 358 (2010) (holding in part that the
honest services statute covers only bribery and kickback schemes).
39
United States v. McDonnell, 64 F. Supp. 3d 783 (E.D. Va. 2014), aff’d, 792 F.3d 478 (4th Cir.
2015), cert. granted in part, 136 S. Ct. 891 (2016), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 2355; Helderman & Zapotosky,
supra note 5.
40
See supra Part I.A.
34
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to encompass “actions that have been clearly established by settled practice
as part of a public official’s position, even if the action was not taken
pursuant to responsibilities explicitly assigned by law.”41 These instructions
further stated that official actions may include acts “that a public official
customarily performs,” “in furtherance of longer-term goals” or “in a series
of steps to exercise influence or achieve an end.”42 After his conviction,
McDonnell appealed the decision, arguing, in part, that the court had given
the jury erroneous instructions about what could constitute an official act.43
The Fourth Circuit heard the McDonnell case in July 2015. On appeal,
McDonnell argued that the trial court’s jury instructions were overly broad
and would render “virtually all of a public servant’s activities ‘official,’ no
matter how minor or innocuous.”44 McDonnell further argued that activities
like the luncheons, meeting arrangements, and photographs in which he
participated can never, in and of themselves, constitute official acts.45 The
Fourth Circuit rejected this argument, holding that “when prosecuting a bribe
recipient, the Government need only prove that he or she solicited or
accepted the bribe in return for performing, or being influenced in, some
particular official act”—the official act does not need to be complete in order
to convict.46 The court further reasoned that to the extent that McDonnell
“made any ‘decision’ or took any ‘action’ on these matters, the federal
bribery laws would hold that decision or action to be ‘official.’”47 The court
concluded that the government had met its burden of showing that
McDonnell made a corrupt agreement with Williams and had used the power
of his office to influence governmental decisions about research into
Anatabloc.48
The Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit, holding that the jury
was erroneously instructed on the meaning of “official act” and that the error
41

See McDonnell, 792 F.3d at 505–06 (“The term official action means any decision or action on
any question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding, or controversy, which may at any time be pending, or which
may by law be brought before any public official, in such public official’s official capacity . . . . [O]fficial
actions may include acts that a public official customarily performs, even if those actions are not described
in any law, rule, or job description. And a public official need not have actual or final authority over the
end result sought by a bribe payor so long as the alleged bribe payor reasonably believes that the public
official had influence, power or authority over a means to the end sought by the bribe payor. In addition,
official action can include actions taken in furtherance of longer-term goals, and an official action is no
less official because it is one in a series of steps to exercise influence or achieve an end.”).
42
McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2373.
43
Id. at 2367.
44
McDonnell, 792 F.3d at 506.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 510.
47
Id. at 516 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3)).
48
Id.
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was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.49 The Court agreed with the
Fourth Circuit’s preliminary findings that the first prong of official action
was met and that there were at least three pending questions or matters about
Anatabloc upon which McDonnell could have taken official action.50 These
pending matters were: (1) whether researchers at Virginia’s state universities
would initiate a study of Anatabloc; (2) whether Virginia’s Tobacco
Commission would allocate grant money for studying anatabine; and (3)
whether Virginia’s health plan for state employees would cover Anatabloc.51
However, the Court emphasized that in order for action to qualify as
“official,” or an adequate quo in the quid pro quo framework, the public
official “must make a decision or take an action on [the identified] question
or matter, or agree to do so.”52 The Court concluded that McDonnell’s acts
of setting up a meeting, hosting an event, and calling other officials about
pending Anatabloc matters did not constitute “official action[s]” on the
identified matters.53
In vacating McDonnell’s conviction and remanding the case, the
Supreme Court relied on its holding in United States v. Sun-Diamond
Growers of California.54 In Sun-Diamond, the Court addressed whether a
corporation’s payment of gratuities to public officials violated the federal
bribery statute. In holding that Sun-Diamond did not violate the statute, the
Court declared that the “[g]overnment must prove a link between a thing of
value conferred upon a public official and a specific ‘official act’ for or
because of which it was given.”55 Sun-Diamond specifically listed examples
that would not qualify as an official act, including the President hosting a
sports team at the White House or the Secretary of Agriculture “deliver[ing]
a speech to ‘farmers concerning various matters of USDA policy.’”56 This
interpretation narrowed the definition of “official act” substantially.
Therefore, applying the definition of “official act” as limited by SunDiamond, the McDonnell Court stated that even if an event, meeting, or
speech is related to a pending question or matter, the public official must do
something more in order for his act to constitute a decision, action, or
agreement to take action on that pending question or matter.57

49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57

McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2375 (2016).
Id. at 2369–70.
Id.
Id. at 2370.
Id. at 2372.
526 U.S. 398 (1999).
Id. at 414.
McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2370 (quoting Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. at 407).
Id.
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The McDonnell Court mentioned additional actions that could qualify
as official acts based on its prior decisions in United States v. Birdsall58 and
Evans v. United States.59 In Birdsall, the Court held that using an official
position to exert pressure on another official to perform an official act, or
using an official position to “provide advice to another official, knowing or
intending that such advice will form the basis for an ‘official act,’” can
qualify as a decision or action under the federal bribery statute.60 Applying
Birdsall to McDonnell’s case, the Court determined, based on testimony
from aides and agency officials, that McDonnell did not exert such pressure
on another official.61 In Evans, the Court held that an agreement to perform
an official act is sufficient for the conduct to fall under the bribery statute.62
Applying this reasoning to McDonnell, the Court held that although it was
possible for the jury to find such agreement in McDonnell’s case, the official
act prong would remain unsatisfied.63 In explaining how McDonnell’s
conduct should be analyzed under the federal bribery statute and its prior
rulings, the Court appeared to be guiding the Fourth Circuit through its
narrowed definition of “official act” for reference on remand of the case.
Ultimately, federal prosecutors asked the Fourth Circuit to remand the
case to the district court so they could file a motion to dismiss. The
Department of Justice (DOJ) issued the following statement: “After carefully
considering the Supreme Court’s recent decision and the principles of federal
prosecution, we have made the decision not to pursue the case further.”64
McDonnell and his wife walked free after a two-year public ordeal, narrowly
escaping prison time.65
II. CRIMINALIZING POLITICS OR ENFORCING ACCOUNTABILITY?
The McDonnell decision carries hefty implications for the prosecution
of public officials on bribery grounds.66 Almost immediately, the decision
58

233 U.S. 223 (1914).
504 U.S. 255 (1992).
60
McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2370 (citing Birdsall, 233 U.S. at 234).
61
Id. at 2363.
62
Evans, 504 U.S. at 260–61 (construing Hobbs Act extortion to include “taking a bribe”).
63
McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2371.
64
Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs, Justice Department Moves to
Dismiss McDonnell Charges (Sept. 8, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-movesdismiss-mcdonnell-charges [https://perma.cc/S62D-AFFS].
65
See Josh Gerstein, Supreme Court Overturns Bob McDonnell’s Corruption Convictions, POLITICO
(June 27, 2016), https://www.politico.com/story/2016/06/supreme-court-overturns-bob-mcdonnellscorruption-convictions-224833 [https://perma.cc/BL3G-BK7Y] (reporting the Supreme Court’s decision
to vacate the conviction).
66
See, e.g., Corasaniti, supra note 32 (“The McDonnell ruling has ‘made it much more difficult for
the government and it made it much more difficult to define actual acts that were taken,’ said Michael
59
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fueled scholarly debate about the competing interests in functional
representative government and public accountability.67 On the one hand, it is
important to strive to achieve a system of democratic representation in which
elected officials may freely interact with a variety of constituents and interest
groups while in office.68 On the other hand, society seeks to deter public
officials from behaving unethically or using public office for self-dealing.69
Such self-serving behavior can undermine the functioning of the
representative government. From these competing interests, two more
competing interests emerge: (1) protecting routine political exchanges from
criminalization (the “criminalization critique”), and (2) ensuring that public
officials are held accountable for self-dealing while in office. This Part
discusses each competing interest in turn.
A. The Criminalization Critique
There is a strong argument favoring a narrow interpretation of “official
act” in the interest of enabling public officials to interact freely with their
constituents without fear of criminalization.70 Along these lines, the
McDonnell Court rejected the government’s broad interpretation of the
statute, because it could cause public officials to question whether they could
“respond to even the most commonplace requests for assistance, and citizens
with legitimate concerns might shrink from participating in democratic
discourse.”71 The Court worried that such a vague, expansive interpretation
would fail to adequately define the crime and could result in arbitrary
Weinstein, a former trial attorney for the Department of Justice. ‘Not a setup, not a meeting, but a real
action that the representative took. That’s a higher burden and a higher standard than had existed
previously.’”).
67
Jennifer Ahearn, A Way Forward for Congress on Bribery After McDonnell, 21 PENN ST. L. REV.
1013, 1024–25 (2017) (advocating for clarification of the federal bribery statute using language in the
existing federal financial conflicts of interest statute and related regulations promulgated by the Office of
Government Ethics); Henry L. Chambers, Jr., The McDonnell Case: A Clarification of Corruption Law
or a Confusing Application of Corruption Law, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 237, 244–54 (2015) (discussing what
official acts a public official must take to be guilty under the public corruption statutes the McDonnells
were convicted of violating).
68
See George D. Brown, McDonnell and the Criminalization of Politics, 5 VA. J. CRIM. L. 1, 13
(2017) (stating the “broader view of American politics and government as highly reciprocal and marked
by interactions of all types.”).
69
Eisler, supra note 29, at 1627 (“Corruption can be understood as deviation from political
integrity . . . and a particular corrupt act can be understood as the violation of a political duty.”). Selfdealing is when one acts “out of self-interest when one should be acting in the interest of another.”
William Statsky, WEST’S LEGAL THESAURUS/DICTIONARY 684 (1985).
70
McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2372 (2016) (“The basic compact underlying
representative government assumes that public officials will hear from their constituents and act
appropriately on their concerns . . . . The Government’s position could cast a pall of potential prosecution
over these relationships . . . . This concern is substantial.”) (emphasis omitted).
71
Id.
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enforcement against public officials, depriving them of their constitutionally
guaranteed right to due process.72 Proponents of the criminalization critique
are primarily concerned that a broad construction of the bribery statute would
enable federal criminal authorities to bring charges against public officials
for “everyday political practices essential to representative government.”73
Some proponents74 contend that McDonnell’s “favors” to Williams
constituted routine political activities “essential to representative
government.”75 Assuming that is true, to convict McDonnell would be to
criminalize politics.76
The “criminalization of politics” critique is not new and has been part
of American legal and political discourse for quite some time.77 The critique
has typically focused on issues of federalism, statutory vagueness, and abuse
of prosecutorial discretion.78 One particular facet of the critique that has
dominated the discourse is that prosecutions of public officials have targeted
political practices that are invariably part of representative democracy, and
are frequently beneficial to the system.79 Under this view, exchanges between
public officials and constituents are integral to the political process and
72

Id. at 2373; see also Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 402–03 (2010) (“To satisfy due
process, ‘a penal statute [must] define the criminal offense [1] with sufficient definiteness that ordinary
people can understand what conduct is prohibited and [2] in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement.’”) (citation omitted).
73
Brown, supra note 68, at 4–5.
74
E.g., Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Center for Law and Justice in Support of Petitioner,
McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016) (No. 15-474), at 11 (“‘The right to participate in
democracy through political contributions is protected by the First Amendment.’” (quoting McCutcheon
v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014)); Amicus Brief of Former Virginia Attorneys General in Support
of Petitioner, McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016) (No. 15-474), at 16 (“The expansive
interpretation of those statutes by the court of appeals will chill the exercise by citizens of their First
Amendment rights to participate in the democratic process. Such a result, if not overturned by this Court,
would wreak havoc on the public life of this nation.”).
75
Brown, supra note 68, at 5.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 11 (“The criminalization critique is thus not a new phenomenon in American political-legal
discourse. It builds upon an extensive body of academic writing and judicial decisions.”); see, e.g.,
Jonathan Rauch, Political Realism: How Hacks, Machines, Big Money, and Back-room Deals Can
Strengthen American Democracy, BROOKINGS INST., May 2015, at 2 (arguing that the democratic system
cannot function without extensive interaction, deal-making, and compromise between officials and
constituents, and that the war on corruption is counterproductive to strengthening our democracy);
Gregory Howard Williams, Good Government by Prosecutorial Decree: The Use and Abuse of Mail
Fraud, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 137, 170 (1990) (arguing in part that prosecutors should develop guidelines
delineating the criteria for federal intervention in the prosecution of governmental corruption). See
generally George D. Brown, Applying Citizens United to Ordinary Corruption: With a Note on
Blagojevich, McDonnell, and the Criminalization of Politics, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 177 (2015)
(analyzing the extent to which the Citizens United outcome extends beyond the electoral context and what
it means for the criminalization of politics).
78
Brown, supra note 68, at 11.
79
Id.
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enhance the effectiveness of government. In his controversial piece entitled
The Value of Political Corruption, Thomas Edsall argues that not all
corruption is bad corruption, and that our system of representative
government would suffer if the rules were not allowed to be bent or stretched
to achieve productive ends.80 Edsall cites prominent Democratic lawyer Bob
Bauer, who described corruption as a “routine ingredient in the competent
practice of politics.”81 What Edsall and Bauer allude to, though perhaps
overstate, is the view that we live in a system of transactional politics, and
that in order be effective in such a system, politicians must engage in political
exchanges among themselves and with their constituents.
The transactional view of politics tends to see mechanisms like
logrolling, campaign contributions, and constituent favors as indicators of a
healthy political system, capable of compromise and conflict resolution. This
reflects the broader, and rather practical, view of American politics as an
ecosystem that is highly reciprocal and demands that actors be willing to
make political bargains to achieve their desired ends.82 The criminalization
critique seeks to protect this system of productive political exchanges and
views the McDonnell decision as a vindication for our current system of
representative governance.
B. Public Accountability
In tension with the criminalization critique is an interest that places a
higher premium on accountability. Proponents of prioritizing public
accountability emphasize that, while the criminalization critique carries
considerable force, virtually all exchanges in our system of transactional
politics will be immunized from liability unless courts draw common law
lines delineating rigorous ethical duties owed by public officials. In other
words, in a world where the fear of criminalizing politics prevails over public
accountability, the “everybody does it” defense83 can always cleanse a
corrupt arrangement. Problematically, this defense rests on the notion that
any corrupt exchange can become a routine political exchange if enough
80

See Thomas B. Edsall, Opinion, The Value of Political Corruption, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/06/opinion/thomas-edsall-the-value-of-political-corruption.html
[https://perma.cc/26WR-8NFW] (arguing that the ban on earmarks and restrictions on campaign finance
demonstrate a naïveté about the realities of governing).
81
Id.
82
Brown, supra note 68, at 13.
83
Id. (citing Dahlia Lithwick, The “Everybody Does It” Defense, SLATE (Apr. 27, 2016),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/supreme_court_dispatches/2016/04/the_supreme_cour
t_might_let_bob_mcdonnell_off_the_hook.html [https://perma.cc/23EK-9RH3] (critiquing the argument
that because a behavior is endemic to the political system and many politicians partake in it, the conduct
should be insulated from prosecution)).
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people do it enough times. One view is that the McDonnell Court created a
standard that immunizes conduct like meetings, luncheons, and rallies from
prosecution simply because they are widespread.84 It makes sense, then, that
the McDonnell decision is viewed by some as a decision that weighs heavily
in favor of the criminalization critique at the expense of public
accountability.85
Some anti-corruption advocates believe that public corruption law
should not only serve to deter the most serious abuses of political power, but
should also advance “public-mindedness.”86 Professor Jacob Eisler asserts
that, in its effort to thwart criminalization of political activities, the Court has
disowned “the advancement of civic governance, specifically by asserting
that officials have no obligation to act with neutrality or disinterest.”87 Eisler
goes so far as to argue that the Court’s interpretation of the federal bribery
statute in McDonnell and the cases leading up to McDonnell have created a
political ecosystem that nurtures self-interested behavior by public
officials.88 He explains that the Court’s lenient stance on bribery is reflective
of the Court’s belief that representatives can advance special interests of
those who have supported them financially, rather than pursuing the public
good.89
Some also believe that the Court’s steady dilution of public bribery
statutes, culminating in the McDonnell holding, has all but encouraged the
perpetuation of a system of pay-to-play politics.90 One potent implication of
McDonnell is that constituents can pay public officials to take action in their
official position, so long as the quo is not an identifiable “official act” as
defined by the McDonnell Court.91 After McDonnell, some public actions
can be sold by public officials without violating the federal bribery statute.92

84

Brown, supra note 68, at 15.
See, e.g., Eisler, supra note 29, at 1622 (“In a series of holdings, the Court has demonstrated
surprising tolerance for sleazy political behavior and consistently overturned convictions of public
servants charged with abusing their offices . . . . The Court’s tolerance for self-interested representative
behavior reached a high-water mark this past term in the unanimous decision of McDonnell v. United
States.”).
86
Id. at 1632.
87
Id. at 1641.
88
Id. at 1642.
89
Id. at 1641–42.
90
See, e.g., Gregory M. Gilchrist, Corruption Law After McDonnell: Not Dead Yet, 165 U. PA. L.
REV. ONLINE 11, 15 (2016) (“In McDonnell, the Supreme Court held that McDonnell’s acts were not
[official acts]—thus preserving a space within which public officials may act to benefit anyone for any
reason, including that the beneficiary is a constituent, a regionally important labor interest, a systemically
important firm, or a rich friend.”).
91
Id.
92
Id.
85
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Prior to the McDonnell decision, New York State Assembly Speaker
Sheldon Silver was convicted of taking millions of dollars in bribes in
exchange for kickbacks and favors, and was sentenced to twelve years in
prison.93 However, in light of McDonnell, the Second Circuit vacated the
district court’s decision, citing the new narrowed definition of “official
act.”94 The concern among good governance advocates is that the McDonnell
Court’s distinction between corrupt acts and routine political exchanges will
exempt far too many cases of self-dealing like Silver’s in the future.
There is clear merit to both perspectives outlined in this Part. In fact,
most scholars and advocates can agree that, while routine political
transactions should not be criminalized, public officials still owe citizens a
minimum duty of loyalty to use their time and resources principally in pursuit
of the public interest. Ideally, the statute would identify a workable test for
determining whether such exchanges cross the line from political
maneuvering to corruption. The next Part will propose a way to do just that
by drawing on fiduciary duties in agency and corporate law.
III. A THIRD WAY: THE DUTY OF LOYALTY
The McDonnell Court drew a line in what had historically been an
unclear area of the law by interpreting “official act” very narrowly.95 The
question that remains is: did they get it right? Where exactly should the line
between “politics as usual” and public corruption be drawn? Arriving at a
middle ground between the criminalization critique and public
accountability is unlikely, given that the narrow McDonnell standard
currently applies, and there is no indication of the Supreme Court overruling
its decision any time soon.96 However, statutory amendment remains a viable

93

United States v. Silver, 184 F. Supp. 3d 33 (S.D.N.Y. 2016), aff’d in part, 864 F.3d 102 (2d Cir.
2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 738 (2018).
94
Matt Zapotosky, The Bob McDonnell Effect: The Bar is Getting Higher to Prosecute Public
Corruption Cases, WASH. POST (July 13, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/the-bob-mcdonnell-effect-the-bar-is-getting-higher-to-prosecute-public-corruptioncases/2017/07/13/5ac5745c-67e6-11e7-9928-22d00a47778f_story.html?utm_term=.27ff81b207fc
[https://perma.cc/3SX4-NBLU] (describing how the narrowed definition of “official act” must be specific
and involve a formal exercise of governmental power).
95
McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2359 (2016).
96
But see Alan Feuer, Silver May Start ‘Parade of Horribles’ Out of McDonnell Case, Critics Say,
N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/13/nyregion/sheldon-silver-bobmcdonnell.html [https://perma.cc/MR5X-MMCC] (explaining how former New York state assemblyman
Sheldon Silver’s corruption conviction was overturned as a result of the McDonnell decision). While
there is no indication that the Supreme Court intends to overrule McDonnell any time soon, it is possible
that the undesirable consequences of the decision, which have already enabled several politicians like
Silver to escape charges for egregious acts, could lead the Court to reconsider its decision in the future.
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way to clarify the statute to create a less arbitrary and more calculated
standard of conduct for public officials.
This Part argues that public officials should be judged according to a
hybrid between the fiduciary duty of loyalty inherent in agency law and
corporate law. This Part suggests that, while neither agency nor corporate
fiduciary standards are alone sufficient to supplant the federal bribery statute,
using duty of loyalty standards in these two areas of law as models should
guide future efforts at amendment. The approach outlined below balances
the concerns of both the proponents of the criminalization critique and those
more concerned with public accountability. This approach is not entirely
new: scholars have long turned to private fiduciary standards to explain
authority of public officials and institutions.97 However, this analysis
uniquely endeavors to draw upon two different private fiduciary principles—
agency law and corporate law—to guide future amendment of the federal
bribery statute in the post McDonnell world.
Prior to understanding how fiduciary duty can inform efforts to reform
public corruption law, it is important to understand the underlying theories
of fiduciary duty and agency in both the private and public contexts.
Fiduciary duty consists of two components: the duty of care and the duty of
loyalty.98 This Part focuses on the latter, which implicates self-dealing cases
like McDonnell’s. Section A summarizes the duties of loyalty in both agency
and corporate law, and Section B explains how the agency model has already
been applied in the public context.
A. Duty of Loyalty: Agency and Corporate Law
In agency law, “[a]gency is the fiduciary relationship that arises when
one person (a ‘principal’) manifests assent to another person (an ‘agent’) that
the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s
control, and the agent manifests or otherwise consents so to act.”99 The
relationship between an employer and an employee is a prototypical agency
relationship.100 The term “agent” is often used more generally to refer to “any
relationship in which one person engages another to perform a service under
97

See generally Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, Keeping the Promise of Public Fiduciary
Theory: A Reply to Leib and Galoob, 126 YALE L.J. F. 192 (Oct. 26, 2016),
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/keeping-the-promise-of-public-fiduciary-theory-a-reply-to-lieband-galoob [https://perma.cc/S3CH-W559] (broadly advocating for the application of fiduciary norms to
public cases); see also D. Theodore Rave, Politicians as Fiduciaries, 126 HARV. L. REV. 671, 677 (2013)
(arguing that political representatives are fiduciaries “subject to a duty of loyalty”).
98
See Constance Frisby Fain, Corporate Director and Officer Liability, 18 UALR L. J. 417, 419–20
(1996) (noting the two duties).
99
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
100
Id. § 7.07(3)(a) (“[A]n employee is an agent . . . .”).

44

113:29 (2018)

McDonnell v. United States

circumstances that involve delegating some discretion over decision-making
to the service-performer.”101 In agency law, one common way by which an
agent may breach the agent’s duty of loyalty is “by obtaining a material
benefit in connection with a transaction undertaken on behalf of the principal
or otherwise through the agent’s use of position.”102 Accordingly, any
personal material benefit the agent derives from the agency relationship
without the principal’s consent constitutes a breach of the duty of loyalty.103
The agency duty of loyalty strictly requires an agent to “act solely for the
benefit of the principal in all matters connected with his agency.”104 Under
agency law, the “usual remedy when the fiduciary appropriates part of the
value of the principal’s asset is disgorgement.”105 The purpose of
disgorgement is to deprive the fiduciary of personal benefits that resulted
from wrongful conduct.106 It is an equitable remedy that results in the
fiduciary giving up any ill-gotten gains and leaves the fiduciary no better and
no worse off than if she had not committed any wrongdoing at all.107
In corporate law, a corporation’s directors do not have a common law
agency relationship with the corporation’s shareholders.108 The duty of
loyalty owed by directors to shareholders is therefore less strict and more
flexible depending on the particular facts surrounding a board or director’s
decision. Unlike agents in agency law, corporate directors can exercise
discretion in making business decisions, and are ordinarily protected by the
presumption of good faith known as the business judgment rule.109 Broadly,
101

Deborah A. DeMott, Disloyal Agents, 58 ALA. L. REV. 1049, 1050–51 (2007).
Id. at 1054.
103
See id. at 1052 (“A principal may consent to conduct by the agent that would otherwise breach a
duty of loyalty, but in obtaining the principal’s consent, the agent must act in good faith and fully disclose
material information to the principal.”).
104
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387 (AM. LAW INST. 1958); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (stating that an agent has “a fiduciary duty to act
loyally for the principal’s benefit in all matters connected with the agency relationship”).
105
Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic Character and
Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1051 (1991).
106
Id. at 1051 n.14.
107
Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, An Economic Model of the Fiduciary’s Duty of Loyalty,
10 TEL AVIV U. STUD. L. 297, 304 (1990) (“Perfect disgorgement can be defined as a sanction that
restores the wrongdoer to the same position that he would have been in but for the wrong. Perfect
disgorgement thus leaves the injurer no better or worse off than if he had done no wrong.”).
108
DeMott, supra note 101, at 1051.
109
See Fain, supra note 98, at 422 (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)) (“The
business judgment rule is a judicially-created presumption that ‘in making a business decision the
directors . . . acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was
in the best interests of the company.’”). In order to receive the benefit of the business judgment rule, the
following conditions must be met: (1) a decision must have been made by the director; (2) the director
must not have stood to gain personally from the subject matter of the decision; and (3) the director must
have exercised informed judgment in making the decision. Id. at 424.
102
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the corporate duty of loyalty “obligates the director and officer to ‘act at all
times in the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders and not
engage in self-dealing.’”110 A director can be held in breach of the duty of
loyalty by engaging in self-dealing, bad faith, or fraud.111
A self-interested transaction eliminates the presumption of good faith
provided by the business judgment rule and instead imposes the rule of
undivided loyalty.112 In self-dealing cases, where the rule of undivided
loyalty applies, Delaware law113 requires a showing that the interested
transaction was fair to the corporation.114 This standard of review is known
as the “entire fairness standard”115 and can overcome a duty of loyalty
challenge based on self-dealing. To succeed on entire fairness review, a
defendant must show that the self-interested transaction was the product of
fair dealing and fair price.116 Thus, courts will examine both the process and
substance of the transaction in making a fairness determination.117 When a
plaintiff challenges a director’s personal transaction with the corporation, the
transaction must be examined “with the most scrupulous care.”118 If there is
any “evidence of improvidence or oppression, any indication of unfairness
or undue advantage, the transaction will be voided.”119 Analysis of fairness
in any particular case tends to turn on the specific facts of the case and

110

Id. at 421 (citing Kirsten L. Thompson, Liability of Professionals, Officers, and Directors: Annual
Survey, 28 TORT & INS. L.J. 376, 385 (1993)).
111
Id. at 421–22.
112
Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2, 7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1944) (“The law has set its face firmly against
undermining ‘the rule of undivided loyalty by the “disintegrating erosion” of particular exceptions.’”)
(internal citations omitted). Undivided loyalty demands that there be no conflict between duty to the
corporation and self-interest. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) (quoting Guth
v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939)).
113
DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 144(a) (2018) (providing that a conflicted interest transaction shall not be void
or voidable solely because of a director’s conflict or solely because the director is present or participates
in the meeting that authorizes the contract provided that the transaction: (1) was approved by a majority
of disinterested directors after disclosure of material facts, (2) was approved by good faith vote of
shareholders following disclosure, or (3) was fair to the corporation at the time it is authorized by the
board or the shareholders).
114
Id. at § 144(a)(3).
115
Lyman Johnson, Unsettledness Delaware Corporate Law: Business Judgment Rule, Corporate
Purpose, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 405, 415 (2013) (“[The business judgment rule] was then more or less
suppressed for controlling shareholders in the 1990s in favor of uniformly using an entire fairness
standard where self-dealing is involved.”).
116
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983).
117
See generally id. (establishing the entire fairness test in which courts will examine transactions
that were made by a majority of directors who were self-interested, or where a majority stockholder stands
on both sides of the transaction by evaluating fairness of price and fairness of process).
118
Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2, 7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1944).
119
Id.
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whether the defendant can meet the burden of proving entire fairness.120 In
the corporate context, the remedy for a breach of the duty of loyalty is either
the invalidation of the conflicted transaction or the payment of damages to
the corporation for the monetary injury sustained as a result of the conflicted
decision.121
B. The Public Context: A Parallel Scenario
The principal-agent relationship under agency law is not dissimilar
from the agency view of politics.122 Under the agency view, elected officials
act on the citizen’s behalf as agents through official decisions and are subject
to the citizen’s control through elections. Importantly, when the general
interests of an official’s constituency conflict with the official’s personal
opinion, agency theory holds that as the principal, the constituency’s
interests must prevail over the elected official’s personal interests.123
The parallels between public and private agency relationships are
substantial. In both cases, the agent decides how to advance the principal’s
interests, and has ultimate discretion in acting to pursue the principal’s
objectives. Like employee agents who are hired to perform specific duties
on behalf of an employer, public officials are elected to perform specific
duties on behalf of citizens. Like corporate directors, who are elected by
shareholders to establish policies for corporate management and oversight
that maximize shareholder value, public officials are elected to positions of
power to make and endorse public policies for the benefit of constituents.
While constituent interests are typically more numerous and diverse than one
principal’s interest under agency law, an elected official is nevertheless
responsible for identifying and advocating for policies that are generally
favorable to her constituency. The clear parallels between the agency
relationship between constituents and elected officials and agency
120

Instead of applying a standard formula, Delaware courts tend to analyze the specific facts unique
to each case to determine whether or not the facts support a claim of self-dealing. See In re Walt Disney
Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 751 (Del. Ch. 2005) (“The classic example that implicates the duty
of loyalty is when a fiduciary either appears on both sides of a transaction or receives a personal benefit
not shared by all shareholders.”).
121
If a court finds that a director’s or board’s conflicted transaction does not meet one of the safe
harbor provisions in the Delaware Code, the court can determine the appropriate remedy, including
invalidation of the conflicted transaction. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 144 (2018).
122
The agency view of politics views voters as the principal and the elected official as the agent. See
TIMOTHY BESLEY, PRINCIPLED AGENTS?: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GOOD GOVERNMENT 114 (2006)
(“US governors correspond fairly well to the standard agency model—a single agent being held
accountable for their actions with well defined election dates and rules.”).
123
See MICHAEL L. MEZEY, REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY: LEGISLATORS AND THEIR
CONSTITUENTS 25–26 (2008) (applying agency theory to dynamics and relationships between
constituents and representatives in a representative democracy).
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relationships in the private or corporate context illustrate why drawing on
private law fiduciary principles can help clarify the federal bribery statute.
IV. APPLYING THE DUTY OF LOYALTY TO MCDONNELL
Incorporating some form of the fiduciary duty of loyalty into public
corruption law is somewhat intuitive. Public officials, like agents
(employees) and corporate directors, are selected to serve the interests of
those who select them. However, the private law analogy is not a perfect one.
Scholars who have argued for identical applications of the duty of loyalty in
the corporate and public contexts have drawn valid criticism,124 often because
one particular variation of the duty of loyalty (e.g. the corporate director
duty) cannot apply seamlessly in the public context. While an amended
statute could establish a public duty of loyalty mirroring the agency duty and
prohibit the official from reaping personal benefit from her office, this type
of per se rule would tend to be unduly restrictive. For example, most elected
officials dedicate some time to re-election activities. While they are already
prohibited from using public resources in campaign activities,125 dedicating
time to election activities could violate the strict agency duty to act at the
will and consent of the principal. Particularly where the principal is the entire
constituency with conflicting interests, enforcing a strict agency duty of
loyalty could prove to be problematic. Applying the corporate duty of loyalty
and incorporating an equivalent of the business judgment rule and the entire
fairness standard is promising, but the remedy of invalidating a transaction
could prove to be problematic in the public context, where it may not be
possible to undo a meeting or invalidate a legislative vote.
In attempting to draw on agency and corporate duties of loyalty, the
same challenge that arose in McDonnell of drawing the line between routine
political transactions and self-dealing and balancing the legitimate concerns
of criminalization critique and public accountability emerges once again.
However, a potential solution emerges in response. Combining the corporate
business judgement rule and entire fairness test as judicial standards of
review with the agency law remedy of disgorgement provides a hybrid
solution that can help clarify where the line between routine exchanges and
political corruption lies.
124

See, e.g., Ethan J. Leib et al., Translating Fiduciary Principles into Public Law, 126 HARV. L.
REV. F. 91, 94 (2013) (“Throughout most of Politicians as Fiduciaries, however, Rave simply analogizes
the legislator to a corporate director and proceeds to a straightforward application of the duty of loyalty
as interpreted in the corporate context. But political relationships and corporate relationships are
sufficiently different that one should be wary of seamless application from one context to the other.”).
125
General Prohibition Against Using Official Resources for Campaign or Political Purposes, H.
Comm. on Ethics, 115th Cong. (2018), https://ethics.house.gov/general-prohibition-against-usingofficial-resources-campaign-or-political-purposes [https://perma.cc/M2R6-F85Z].
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This Comment proposes using a hybrid of the agency and corporate
duties of loyalty to amend the federal bribery statute and draw a line that
balances interests in flexibility and accountability. Applying a combination
of the underlying principles of agency law, a public-oriented version of the
entire fairness test, and the disgorgement remedy associated with agency law
would lead to balanced assessment of each case and would lead to prudent
outcomes in a wide range of public corruption cases. A standard that adopts
the corporate entire fairness test and the agency remedy of disgorgement
would give public officials the opportunity to prove the fairness of their
transactions and would simultaneously require disgorgement if the public
official is found guilty. In McDonnell’s case, the price of connecting
Williams to state agency officials was over $175,000 and the process of their
exchanges involved only McDonnell, his family, and Williams, with no
disclosure to his constituents. In order to prevail, McDonnell would need to
prove that his transactions with Williams were fair, given the duty of loyalty
he owed Virginia constituents. Applying this framework would advance the
criminalization critics’ interest in preserving officials’ ability to freely
interact with constituents and would also hold officials like McDonnell
accountable when they use their public office to engage in unreasonable selfdealing with constituents.
Former Governor Bob McDonnell engaged in a conflicted transaction
with a constituent from which he materially benefitted. He used public
resources, including the governor’s mansion, to secure personal benefits
from Jonnie Williams in excess of $175,000.126 Under the duty of loyalty
framework proposed in this Comment, McDonnell would have had the
opportunity to defend himself in a public corruption case using the entire
fairness standard. To do so, he would have had to prove that his dealings
with Williams were fair127 to his constituents, and that Williams paid him a
fair price128 of $175,000 for constituent services. Applying this proposed
126

McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2362–64 (2016).
The Court could define “fair dealing” as falling within what we consider to be an acceptable
political exchange. As in the corporate context, this would involve a review of “process, including how
the transaction is timed, initiated, structured, negotiated.” Shant H. Chalian & Kristen M. Bandura, The
Business Judgment Rule and the Entire Fairness Doctrine, ROBINSON & COLE LLP (accessed Aug. 25,
2018),
http://www.rc.com/documents/Primer%20on%20Business%20Judgment%20Rule.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S64N-F4F2].
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The Court could define “fair price” by incorporating the cap imposed by state law on gifts to
public officials. Shortly after the McDonnell scandal, Virginia enacted a “$100 annual aggregate cap on
gifts that public officials can receive from people seeking influence with the state.” Laura Vozzella,
Virginia Legislature Adopts Stricter Gift Standards for Public Officials, WASH. POST (Apr. 17, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-politics/virginia-legislature-adopts-stricter-giftstandards/2015/04/17/b400b6a0-e456-11e4-905f-cc896d379a32_story.html?utm_term=.eecb1bd52927
[https://perma.cc/A3GL-XLX7] (quoting Governor Terry McAuliffe).
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standard would have likely resulted in the conclusions that McDonnell’s
dealings with Williams were not fair to all constituents to whom he owed a
duty of loyalty, and that the price of $175,000 was far in excess of a
reasonable “price” for constituent services. Under this test, the Court likely
would have found that McDonnell violated his duty of loyalty and that his
actions resulted in measurable damages.
We can easily calculate damages in the McDonnell case using
disgorgement as a civil remedy in addition to any criminal liability found.129
In this case, McDonnell would owe $175,000 in ill-gotten gains to the state.
By drawing on both agency and corporate law duties of loyalty, reformers
can envision the contours of a new statutory standard of conduct that is more
practicable and less arbitrary than allowing the verdict of a massive selfdealing scheme to turn on the highly subjective definition of “official act.”
CONCLUSION
The Court’s continual narrowing of the scope of the federal bribery
statute has culminated in the McDonnell decision. The Court’s new
definition of “official act” only condemns the most amateur and poorly
executed acts of corruption. It rewards the obfuscation of political dealings
and encourages widespread participation in corrupt practices that are viewed
as merely routine political transactions and are thus immunized from
scrutiny. Society strives to uphold a representative system in which public
officials are sufficiently constrained by law to act in the public interest but
are simultaneously given enough leeway to engage in transactional politics
when necessary. The McDonnell decision fails to achieve such a balance,
and instead narrows the scope of “official act” so severely that it essentially
provides public officials with a blank check to sell their public offices in
return for “unofficial” favors.130
The possibility of statutory amendment remains viable, and this
possibility is becoming increasingly urgent in light of similar issues
surrounding public corruption cases since McDonnell.131 The duty of loyalty
129

The federal bribery statute is a criminal statute with criminal remedies. This Comment focuses
narrowly on developing a more effective standard of review for public corruption cases but does not
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Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Vacates Ex-Virginia Governor’s Graft Conviction, N.Y. TIMES
(June 27, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/28/us/politics/supreme-court-bob-mcdonnellvirginia.html [https://perma.cc/5FBL-KLM9] (quoting Anna Scholl, the executive director of Progress
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See, e.g., Nick Corasaniti & Nate Schweber, Corruption Case Against Senator Menendez Ends
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embedded in the law of agency and in corporate law are useful models to
examine when amending the federal bribery statute. A hybrid of the agency
duty of loyalty and the corporate duty of loyalty would address the concerns
of proponents of both the criminalization critique and of public
accountability. Further, drawing on both standards by balancing agency
law’s per se rule with corporate law’s entire fairness standard ameliorates
difficulties associated with simply transplanting pure agency law or pure
corporate law into the public context. Incorporating this framework as an
amendment to the federal bribery statute has the potential to effectively deter
and punish officials who engage in public corruption in the future.

November 2017 public corruption case in which a judge had to declare a mistrial because the jurors were
deadlocked despite nine weeks of testimony). Senator Menendez and his friend Dr. Salomon Melgen
were charged in an eighteen-count indictment including charges for bribery and honest services fraud in
2015. United States v. Menendez, 132 F. Supp. 3d 635 (D.N.J. 2015). In January 2018, the DOJ dismissed
the case, which some say was due in part to how McDonnell “significantly raised the bar for prosecutors
who try to pursue corruption cases against elected officials.” Nick Corasaniti, Justice Department
Dismisses
Corruption
Case
Against
Menendez,
N.Y. TIMES
(Jan.
31,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/31/nyregion/justice-department-moves-to-dismiss-corruption-caseagainst-menendez.html [https://perma.cc/RE4U-RHEK]; see also United States v. Silver, 184 F. Supp.
3d 33 (S.D.N.Y. 2016), aff’d in part, 864 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 738 (2018)
(New York State Assembly Speaker Sheldon Silver was convicted of taking millions of dollars in bribes
in exchange for kickbacks and favors, and was sentenced to twelve years in prison, but his conviction
was vacated following the McDonnell ruling); William K. Rashbaum, No Charges, but Harsh Criticism
for de Blasio’s Fund-Raising, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/16/
nyregion/mayor-bill-de-blasio-investigation-no-criminal-charges.html [https://perma.cc/6KRK-JGDD]
(Federal prosecutors decided not to bring charges against New York Mayor Bill de Blasio citing, in part,
changes in the law, which was interpreted by many to mean the McDonnell ruling).
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